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IS "ADEQUACY" A MORE "POLITICAL
QUESTION" THAN "EQUALITY?": THE
EFFECT OF STANDARDS-BASED
EDUCATION ON JUDICIAL
STANDARDS FOR EDUCATION FINANCE
Avidan Y. Cover*
INTRODUCTION
"There are two human inventions which may be considered more
difficult than any others - the art of government, and the art of educa-
tion; and peoples still contend as to their very meaning."' These words,
written by Immanuel Kant over two centuries ago, characterize the lon-
gevity of the battle over government and education and reveal why the
conflict deepens when the two intersect. Public financing of education
has bedeviled this country and its leaders since at least the end of the
nineteenth century.2 In particular, government funding of education pro-
duces immense disagreement resulting in litigation that is as much about
economics as it has been about questions concerning race, class, gender
or housing.3 Indeed, the question of how society funds education is si-
multaneously a question regarding the definition of education itself and
hence a vision of that society as well.4
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 2002. B.A., Princeton University 1995. I would like to
thank my wife, Lora Levy Cover, whose passion for education, children, and equity inspires
me.
1 IMMANUEL KANT, KANT ON EDUCATION (UBER PADAGOGIK) 12 (Annette Churton
trans., 1900).
2 See R. CRAIG WOOD & DAVID C. THOMPSON, EDUCATION FINANCE LAW: CONSTITU-
TIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS - AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 4 (1996) (reviewing
the early history of education finance litigation).
3 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996) (declaring unconstitutional the
exclusion of women from Virginia Military Institute); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding Texas' education finance system which resulted in unequal
levels of spending among local school districts caused by unequal amounts of taxable wealth);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring unconstitutional racially segregated
education).
4 Amy Gutmann expounds upon this idea in great detail in her democratic theory of
education which focuses on "the ways in which citizens are or should be empowered to influ-
ence the education that in turn shapes the political values, attitudes and modes of behavior...
on practices of deliberate instruction by individuals and on the educative influences of institu-
tions." AMY GIUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 14 (1999). Gutmann's theory of education
financing upholds a democratic distribution, which would require increased federal and state
spending to ensure that all children receive an education at a certain threshold. Local districts
would be free to increase their own funding above that threshold. Unfortunately Gutmann
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Although there is no Federal Constitutional right to education, 5 the
constitution of every state obligates the legislature to provide a system of
public schools. 6 Except for special education and certain aid require-
ments such as Title I, the Federal Government has little impact on the
structure of schools. 7 States retain the primary legal responsibility for
the financing of the public schools along with hiring, curricula and stan-
dards decisions. However, states may often apportion such authority to
the local districts. 8 Thus most plaintiffs bring education finance litiga-
tion cases in state courts. Litigation generally challenges the state fund-
ing schemes that usually rely on local school district property taxes as the
primary source of expenditures or as the basis for the state funding
scheme.9 On the whole, wealthy property districts can more generously
fund their schools at a lower tax rate than poor property districts. In fact,
poor districts may tax property at an even higher rate than the wealthy
districts, yet generate less revenue. 10
Education finance litigation began with challenges of disparities in
funding based on Federal Constitutional Equal Protection claims. 1' In
the wake of the San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
decision, however, litigants moved to challenges of such disparities
based in part on the state constitution equal protection and education
clauses. 12 The tenor of the cases remained focused on the inequality of
funding. The mixed success of these challenges prompted plaintiffs to
focus increasingly on the state constitution education clauses and bring
claims of unconstitutionally inadequate schooling. 13 These recent cases
have not necessarily demanded equal funding but have sought judicial
does not provide any workable framework from which either legislative or judicial body could
determine a precise standard or number. See id. at 139-148.
5 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. The Court declared that education was not a funda-
mental interest regardless of its clear social importance.
6 Scholars disagree as to whether or not Mississippi has an education clause. For an
argument that the state does have such a clause see Molly McUsic, The Use of Education
Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. LEGIS. 307, 311 n.5 (1991). Contra
William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions
in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1661 (1989). State consti-
tution education clauses may be found in Wood, supra note 2, at I 11.
7 A 1992-1993 breakdown of school funding determined the average state share was
45.6%. The average local district share was 47.4% and the average Federal share was just
under 7%. See Molly McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises
and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM 88, 99 (Jay P. Heubert
ed., 1999).
8 See id.
9 See WooD, supra note 2, at 19 (describing education finance distribution formulas);
see also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS, 368-78 (1988) (characterizing the
methods of allocation of public educational funds).
10 See id.
I I See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
12 See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
13 See Pauley v. Kelly, 324 S.E.2d 128 (Ky. 1989).
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enforcement of a constitutional minimum standard of education. In addi-
tion, the growing movement of state legislature or state education depart-
ment imposed uniform education standards has provided plaintiffs the
necessary amplification of state constitution education clauses. 14
Some scholars view the shift in litigation strategy from claims of
inequality to claims of inadequacy as an inevitable and logical response
to court resistance to equalization. 15 Critics charge the consequences of
equality arguments include complex financial arrangements, intrusion on
local control, and threats to wealthy districts. 16 Adequacy claims, on the
other hand, appeal to general notions of fairness, do not threaten rich
localities, better cohere with the educational standards movement, and
find clear textual basis in state constitutions. 17
The difficulty with the above analysis is that the shift has not been
so pronounced. 18 Plaintiffs usually bring multiple claims, including ade-
quacy and equality causes of action. Moreover, equality concerns inform
the adequacy argument. Defining adequacy inevitably entails compari-
sons of disparate district wealth and spending. In addition, remedies will
invariably include directives to change spending formulae, thereby af-
fecting local control and potentially taking money from wealthy districts.
Finally, proponents of adequacy do not address the ability or wisdom of
the courts' larger role in defining education and its standards. Nor do
they sufficiently address the loss of the moral suasion of the equality
argument.
Within the recent adequacy cases the courts confront two significant
issues. Whether they explicitly address these matters may be a matter of
the facts of the case itself, the court's temperament or a myriad of other
factors. First, in adjudicating the financing of schools the judiciary must
circumscribe its own role relative to legislative and executive preroga-
tives. This is the question of separation of powers and the court's own
institutional competence. Second, the courts must define, in some man-
ner, the purposes of education.
This Note argues that the recent shift in state court litigation from an
equality claim to one of adequacy has compelled many courts to insert
themselves in the discussion and creation of educational policy that was
previously viewed as unacceptable. This evolution may render courts
14 See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third
Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1175 (1995).
15 See, e.g., Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 157 (1995).
16 Id. at 155-62; see also State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third
Wave," supra note 14, at 1168-72.
17 Enrich, supra note 15, at 166-83; see also Heise, supra note 14, at 1174-76.
18 See Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a Change in
Attitudes, 34 HARV. CR-CL. L. REV. 547, 562-67 (1999).
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vulnerable to appellate challenges and criticisms of nonjusticiability and
political question doctrine violations regarding institutional competence
and judicial prudence. In addition, the demise of the equality argument
diminishes the moral strength of the court's normative valuation capac-
ity. Section I examines the history of education finance cases and re-
views the three waves of litigation strategies, which evolved from an
equality argument to one of adequacy. Section II explores in greater de-
tail the concerns of state court judicial policymaking, including issues of
separations of powers, justiciability and the political question doctrine.
Section III analyzes the difficulties and benefits of judicial administra-
tion of the adequacy standard. Section IV examines the changes in the
New York courts' jurisprudence as manifested in the equality case of
Board of Education of Levittown v. Nyquist19 and the current adequacy
case of Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York. 20 Section IV will
also ascertain the effect of the standards-based education movement on
litigation and jurisprudence. This Note concludes that state courts should
cautiously embrace adequacy arguments because they will more likely
enmesh the judiciary in the legislative realm raising questions of compe-
tence and anti-majoritarian concerns. Furthermore, the courts should not
abdicate their role of articulating normative values by precluding equal-
ity challenges. Federal regulations that address disparate impact may af-
ford state courts one means of ensuring equal educational opportunities.
I. EDUCATION FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION STRATEGIES
Despite the moral rhetorical reverberations of the first decision of
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1)21 the practical effects of desegre-
gation do not resonate in American classrooms today.22 Generally edu-
cation reform strategy no longer focuses on racial or even class
integration, but rather seeks financial reform. 23 In the last thirty years
courts and litigants have increasingly distanced themselves from the dis-
course of race, equality, and integration and spoken more often in terms
of money, adequacy and local control. 24 Rather than accept the current
state of education jurisprudence as inevitable, it is necessary to examine
the antecedent legal strategy and thought in order to best appraise today's
goals and methods.
19 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982).
20 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 187 Misc.2d I (N.Y. Sup. 2001).
21 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGA-
TION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 1 (1993).
23 But see James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L. J. 249, 307 (1999)
(proposing reorientation of school finance litigation to focus on racial and socioeconomic inte-
gration rather than financial equalization as more effective education policy).
24 See id. at 258-72.
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A. BROWN, EQUALITY, AND THE DEMISE OF DESEGREGATION
In Brown the Supreme Court recognized "education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments. '25 The Court
expressed doubts "that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportu-
nity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms."'26 The overturning of the "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson27 led to numerous desegre-
gation cases. However, just as the remedies of Brown proved difficult to
implement, so too did the later court resolutions often escape implemen-
tation.2 8 In fact, some question the realized efficacy of the decision.29
Notwithstanding the importance of Brown, within twenty years of that
landmark case, courts began a process of judicially enforced resegrega-
tion that dismantled previous mandated integration and has maintained or
imposed segregation that society still suffers today. 30
From 1954 through 1974 the Supreme Court defined. desegregation
as the means to achieving equality. The Court did not defer to states'
rights argument or the cause of local control, but voiced concern for the
protection of individual rights and respect for the law. 3' Passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act led to incentives for desegregation and Federal
prosecution of discrimination. 32 By emphasizing the constitutional ne-
cessity of equal education in Brown, the Court had arguably precipitated
concerted governmental action in all three branches against racism and
inequality. 33
25 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
26 Id. at 493.
27 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
28 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II) (ordering the states to
desegregate with the vague phrase of "all deliberate speed").
29 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 42-169 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1991) (questioning the effects of court decisions on policy, primarily the effect of the Brown I
decision on civil rights).
30 See Gary Orfield, Conservative Activists and the Rush Toward Resegregation, in LAW
AND SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 7, at 43 (describing the larger and more activist role of
contemporary judges in resegregation cases than that of 1950s and 1960s judges in desegrega-
tion cases).
31 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (finding local
school districting did not preclude busing as a means to desegregate); Griffin v. County Sch.
Bd. of Prince Edward County, 375 U.S. 391 (1964) (granting certiorari without awaiting final
action by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on the issue of closing public schools to
avoid desegregation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (ordering Arkansas Governor to
obey a federal district court order to integrate a Little Rock high school).
32 See Orfield, supra note 29, at 46. Until Congress acted ,in 1964, 98% of southern
African Americans were still in completely segregated schools. See id.
33 By 1970 southern states that had legally mandated segregation-were the most desegre-
gated in the United States. See id. at 47.
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In the early 1970s the Court limited the range and scope of equality
through two education cases. In Rodriguez the Court made clear educa-
tion was not a fundamental right. 34 Finding no issue of race, the Court
held that the differences in different district spending were a matter of
local prerogative and thus did not violate the Constitution.35 In Milliken
v. Bradley the Court held a metropolitan desegregation plan unconstitu-
tional that would have required integration of urban and suburban areas
without a showing of suburban intent to segregate. 36 Subsequently, the
Federal courts began limiting desegregation policies. 37 The two deci-
sions represented a turning point in the Court's education jurisprudence.
While Rodriguez stood for the proposition that education was not a fun-
damental right, both cases shared the high court's decisive resistance to
implementing interdistrict remedies. To what degree state courts have
been constrained by these two holdings remains the underlying concern
of the rest of this Note.
B. EDUCATION FINANCE LITIGATION
School funding cases derive their impetus from the civil rights
cases. Judges and litigants embroiled in disparities of school district
spending invariably cite Brown and quote its emphasis on the importance
of education. 38 However, finance and desegregation cases diverge at the
critical juncture of race. Viewed by some litigants as either a more prac-
tical or palatable strategy, education funding claimants principally rely
on differences in money, rather than on variances in color. The strategy
has undergone many permutations, reacting to both adjudication and
popular sentiment. Generally, scholars depict three "waves" of educa-
tion finance litigation. 39
1. The First Wave
Efforts to dismantle the funding schemes of public schools as un-
constitutional succeeded in 1971 with the California case Serrano v.
Priest.40 The California Supreme Court held that the state's school dis-
trict funding based on property tax caused disparities that violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The California court
34 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); infra Section
II.B. 1
35 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.
36 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
37 See Orfield, supra note 30, at 48-53.
38 See e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995).
39 See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C.L. Rev. 597, 600-04 (1994); En-
rich, supra note 15, at 104-15; Heise, supra note 14, at 1153-66.
40 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
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found education was a fundamental right4 ' and wealth a suspect class.42
Applying strict scrutiny, the court ruled local control was not a compel-
ling interest justifying different treatment.43
Excitement over this case was short lived. In 1973 the United
States Supreme Court declared in Rodriguez44 that education was not a
fundamental right4 5 and wealth was not a suspect class. 46 The Court
made clear that the Brown rhetoric concerning education's significance
did not render education a fundamental right.4 7 Without explicit or im-
plicit Constitutional guarantee education could not be considered a fun-
damental right.48 By a 5 to 4 margin, utilizing the rational basis
standard, the Court found local control rationally justified the school
funding system.49
2. The Second Wave
Though the Rodriguez decision essentially foreclosed Federal Equal
Protection arguments, education finance litigants found hope in state
constitution equal protection arguments. Plaintiffs continued to focus on
the unequal state distribution of funding. 50 Most state constitutions have
equal protection clauses similar in language and in scope to the federal
clause.5' Moreover, every state constitution includes an education
clause, providing litigants a clearer textual basis than the United States
Constitution affords for arguing education is a fundamental right.52 State
Constitution arguments also permitted plaintiffs to apply different scru-
tiny approaches, potentially expanding suspect classes to include wealth
or constricting governmental interests to exclude local control. 53
Commentators usually point to the New Jersey Supreme Court
Robinson v. Cahil154 decision as the beginning of this wave of litigation.
In light of the Rodriguez decision, the New Jersey court focused only on
the state constitution's education clause. This approach differed from
later second wave cases by excluding reliance on the state's equal protec-
tion clause. However, the Robinson court found the language of the New
41 See id. at 1258-59.
42 See id. at 1250.
43 See id. at 1263.
44 See 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
45 See id. at 30.
46 See id. at 28.
47 See id. at 30.
48 See id. at 35.
49 See id. at 2.
50 See Heise, supra note 14, at 1157.
51 See WOOD, supra note 2, at 111-32.
52 See id.
53 See Enrich, supra note 15, at 105-07.
54 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
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Jersey constitution's education provision gave each New Jersey child the
right to receive from the state equal education opportunities. 55 Thus the
court held disparities in district funding violated the New Jersey
Constitution.56
Whether litigants relied solely on the state constitution education
clause or attacked their state education funding schemes with a dual em-
phasis on the education clause and equal protection clause of state consti-
tutions, the articulated wrong was one of inequality in district spending.
From 1973 to 1989 about as many state courts upheld state education
systems as declared them unconstitutional under the equality theory. 57
One critical reason for resistance to the equality theory was state court
concern over the ramifications of mandated uniform education spending
in other areas of state government funding.58 Courts hesitated to call for
equal education funding because others might infer a mandate for equali-
zation of funding in all areas of government, thereby encroaching on
local autonomy.5 9 The mixed success led education finance reformers to
seek a new theory distinguishing school funding from the panoply of
other state funded services. 60
3. The Third Wave
The language of equality receded slightly, as litigants began to em-
phasize adequacy of education as their primary concern. The transition
entailed focusing more on the education clause, its legislative history and
the status of statewide education. Rather than address the legal question
of whether the education clause required equal funding, courts were
asked to define or amplify the meaning of the education clause. Instead
of determining the factual issue of whether there was disparate school
funding, state judges had to decide what amount of funding would
achieve that constitutionally required level of education. The adequacy
theory involved a more substantive rather than comparative assessment
of education and its funding.
In Rose v. Council for Better Education61 the Kentucky Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional the entire state education system.62 The
Kentucky court found even the state's wealthy districts inadequately
55 See id. at 291, 292; see also N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
56 See id. at 297.
57 See Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise
of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32
GA. L. REV. 543, at 576 (1998).
58 See Enrich, supra note 15, at 161-62.
59 See id.
60 See Heise, supra note 14, at 1162.
61 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
62 Id. at 215.
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funded in comparison to the rest of the country.63 The court did not limit
itself to striking down simply the finance scheme but created or rede-
fined what constituted an adequate education. The court articulated
seven clear goals that must be achieved in order to meet the standard of
an adequate education.64 The verdict led to massive state reform by the
legislature and much acclaim for Kentucky's present education system.
The Rose decision led many state courts to craft similarly more de-
tailed education standards out of state constitutional provisions. 65 How-
ever, it is unclear that adequacy cases have fared any better than equality
cases. 66 While the adequacy theory permits courts to avoid the "Robin
Hood" epithets that accompanied comparing and curing school district
funding disparities under equality theory, the courts arguably intrude
even more into the legislative realm of education. Such separation of
powers concerns and the newness and difficulty of creating education
standards may explain the third wave's mixed success. Whether such
judicial anxieties should limit courts in invalidating school funding struc-
tures is the primary question in current education finance jurisprudence.
II. STATE COURT INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION POLICY
A. THE COURT'S QUESTIONABLE CAPACITY AND LEGITIMACY TO
MAKE POLICY
Critics of judicial intervention in policy matters question both the
legitimacy and capacity of courts to address such issues.67 The Supreme
Court articulated such concerns regarding education finance in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.68 Noting the eco-
nomic, social, and philosophical complexities of education, the Court ad-
vised lower courts to "refrain from imposing on the states inflexible
constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the contin-
63 See id. at 198.
64 See id. at 212. The seven goals are: 1) oral and written communication skills; 2)
knowledge of social, economic, and political systems; 3) understanding of governmental
processes; 4) knowledge of mental and physical wellness; 5) foundation in the arts; 6) training
for life work; and 7) academic and vocational training to compete with students from other
states. Id.
65 See e.g., McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.
1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993).
66 See Heise, supra note 57.
67 See MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 5-10, 11-15 (1982). Policy making
may be defined as the action or inaction of governments-"specifically the regulation of be-
havior and the distribution of benefits." CHARLES S. LOPEMAN, THE ACrIvIsT ADVOCATE:
POLICY MAKING IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 2 (1999). Though it is arguable courts make
policy every time they render a decision, critics are primarily concerned with instances where
court decisions affect parties beyond the dispute and change established policies of the legisla-
ture or the executive. See id. at 3.
68 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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ued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solu-
tions to educational problems. '69 Despite these admonitions education
finance litigation did not abate, finding particularly fertile ground in state
courts.
70
1. Illegitimacy
Judicial action in education finance elicits questions of legitimacy
because decisions of education financing are viewed as the province of
the legislature. 71 The basis of these concerns derives largely from sepa-
ration of powers conceptions. Since determinations of state funding af-
fect the whole population of the state, the legislature is regarded as the
body best suited for expressing the will of the people. This branch is
seen as most representative of the people in that its members are elected,
hence accountable, and is the body invested with responsibility for mak-
ing the law. In contrast, the judiciary is often an unelected body, gaining
much of its respect and authority from its distance from political matters,
whose power is to adjudicate disputes, not to make law. Judicial in-
volvement in education finance is thus anti-majoritarian, elitist and di-
minishes people's faith in the power of representative government.
2. Incapacity
While the question of legitimacy invites vigorous debate on largely
ideological grounds with little resolution in sight, concerns over the ca-
pacity of courts to decide matters of education finance are more suscepti-
ble to some empirical analysis and hence resolution. Critics suggest that
the courts are not as well equipped to determine proper education financ-
ing formulae and related issues, as are the legislative and executive
branches. 72 They charge that the adversary process and rules of evidence
hamper the synthesizing of information necessary for proper policy de-
terminations. In addition detailed and complex matters of policy require
specialized training and background rather than generalized judicial
experience. 73
Perhaps the most damming criticism of judicial involvement, how-
ever, addresses judicial inability to implement, oversee, and enforce rem-
edies. Rather than deliver decisive case-by-case determinations, the
court must engage itself in an ongoing process, taxing its time and re-
69 id. at 43.
70 See supra Section I. B. 2 -3.
71 See Rodriguez 411 U.S. at 38-53, 58-59 (determining that the "ultimate solutions must
come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them"); En-
rich, supra note 15, at 127 n.123.
72 See REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 67, at 5-15.
73 See id.
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sources.74 More significantly, courts have limited powers of coercion,
whereas policy implementation may require a variety of incentives for
statewide action as well as extensive and continuous modification. In
contrast the legislature and executive have berths of power that include
subsidizing or taxing certain behaviors, as well as normative clout to
declare policy.
B. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
The distinguishing characteristics of the three branches of govern-
ment contribute to the much debated and maligned "Political Question"
doctrine. The basic premise of the doctrine is that there are certain issues
that are nonjusticiable because they are outside the judiciary's proper
domain.75 The determination that an issue implicates a political question
may also be characterized as acknowledging "the possibility that a con-
stitutional provision may not be judicially enforceable. '76 Whether this
is a constitutional or a prudential limitation on courts is unclear. The
ambiguity regarding the doctrine's underlying authority is due in part to
what may be charitably characterized as inconsistent invocation of the
doctrine.77
Notwithstanding arguments regarding the doctrine's basis, at the
very least most courts will entertain prudential considerations of the is-
sue's justiciability. Professor Alexander Bickel articulated the view that
courts should hesitate to hear cases where certain factors are present.
7 8
74 Such judicial oversight is characteristic of public action litigation where the court es-
sentially acquires the role of manager of the assailed institution. See OWEN Fiss, THE CIVIL
RiGHTs INJUNCTION 7 (1978).
75 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, at 217 (1962). The Supreme Court characterized
political questions as normally involving at least one of the following aspects:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate po-
litical department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertak-
ing independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to A politi-
cal decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
76 United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992).
77 See, e.g., id. (upholding a statutorily-mandated method of representative apportion-
ment and rejecting the government's argument that this was a nonjusticiable political issue);
contra Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (rejecting an impeached judge's challenge
of the Senate impeachment process on grounds that it presented a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion because of clear commitment of the issue to the Senate and a lack of judicial standards).
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has characterized the Baker v. Carr criteria as "useless in identi-
fying what constitutes a political question." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
144-45 (1994).
78 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962).
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Bickel's theory presumes judicial incapacity from the outset and appears
to suggest that concerns of its own legitimacy should dictate whether the
court grants jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. Unfortunately, the pru-
dential viewpoint does not suggest what factors, if any, would require
judicial review. But as Justice Souter noted in a concurrence in a recent
political question case, "[n]ot all interference is inappropriate or disre-
spectful, however, and application of the doctrine ultimately turns, as
Learned Hand put it, on 'how importunately the occasion demands an
answer." 79 Whether education finance is such an occasion may depend
on which state court the litigants go before and what claim they make.
Some scholars have questioned the existence of a political question
doctrine at all. They have pointed, in particular, to the lack of political
question cases in domestic affairs. However, even if the political ques-
tion doctrine does not serve as a constitutional bright-line limitation on
judicial review of state education funding, the prudential concerns dis-
cussed above may lead courts to reject a challenge rather than refuse
jurisdiction. Indeed, it is unclear how often a court may choose to find
certain legislative action does not violate the Constitution, largely
animated by justiciability concerns, rather than cite the political question
doctrine. Such a possibility invites us to ask: what in fact is the func-
tional difference between declaring a constitutional provision is not judi-
cially enforceable and upholding a legislative act as constitutional?
C. IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY AND CAPACITY TO MAKE
POLICY
1. A Theoretical Framework
Professor Edward B. Foley has argued that the judiciary should not
defer to the legislature on the matter of a child's Federal Constitutional
right to adequate education. 80 Foley puts forth John Hart Ely's represen-
tation-reinforcing theory of judicial review as a particularly legitimate
basis for intervention in education finance. Given the centrality of edu-
cation in the democratic process, representation-reinforcing theory mili-
tates against deference because the court "may insist that the legislature
grant citizens any rights essential to the operation of a democratic politi-
cal process."'' s In addition, the theory argues persuasively for judicial
protection of interests of persons who are often ignored in the political
process. Clearly, the education of a child is such an interest.82
79 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253 (Souter, J., concurring).
80 See Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revisited: Constitutional Theory and School Fi-
nance, 32 GA. L. REv. 475, 498-515 (1998).
81 Id. at 502.
82 See id. at 508.
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Even if it is accepted that the judiciary should protect under-
represented children's interests, there remains concern over the compe-
tency of the courts: might the judiciary overreach in its protection?
Acknowledging this possibility, Foley suggests that the risk is balanced
by the equally likely possibility of "legislative underprotection" of the
children's interests. 83 Foley concludes the effects of legislative under-
protection (inadequate education for poor children) are more deleterious
than the consequences of judicial overprotection (increased taxes). 84
In response to criticism that judicial intervention in education fi-
nance intrudes on the legislative powers, Foley's conception of a Federal
Constitutional right to an adequate education suggests "there are certain
budget categories that are truly nondiscretionary." 85 Thus, an under-
standing of an adequate education as a fundamental right argues for the
judiciary's upholding of such a positive right and its concomitant funding
from the legislature. As to what an adequate education should consist of,
Foley argues legislatures have no more education expertise than judges.
A well-constructed standard of adequate education could assure one of
accurate and fair court determinations. 86
2. Legitimacy
An ascendant judicial role in education finance gains support from a
conception of the Constitution as the fundamental safeguard of individ-
ual rights. In such a construct the judiciary serves as guardian interpreter
of the Constitution in order to constrain the legislative powers from re-
straining individual liberty. 87 Thus the increased role of government in
peoples' lives compels further judiciary intervention.
Criticisms that judicial intervention in policy matters is anti-demo-
cratic ignore alternative means of popular accountability. First, the legis-
lature may pursue a Constitutional amendment to modify judgments it
disdains. It should be noted that the state constitutional amendment pro-
cess is often not an as cumbersome and extraordinary as the process
within the Federal structure. Second, popular sentiment, depending on
how loudly voiced, may alter later decisions by the court.88 Third, many
states elect their judges, removing anti-majoritarian critics' electoral ac-
83 See id. at 509.
84 See id. at 510. The balancing of risks is largely predicated on John Rawls's theory of
the "veil of ignorance." The theory postulates what principles of justice would be chosen by
persons behind a "veil of ignorance" which blinded them to any distinguishing characteristics
of other people. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971). Foley argues that a
person behind the veil of ignorance would prefer a certain qualitative education for all over
fewer taxes. See Foley, supra note 80, at 510.
85 Foley, supra note 80, at 513.
86 See id. at 514-15. Foley's definition of adequate education follows on pages 515-40.
87 See REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 67, at 6.
88 See id. at 7.
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countability concerns. Even where states do not hold judicial elections,
legislatures may hold some control over courts given their power over
judiciary budgets. Finally, as Foley suggests above, the potentially un-
derrepresentative legislature may require a balance of an imperfectly
democratic political process with an imperfectly anti-democratic judicial
process. 89
3. Capacity
While critics cite the complex and discrete information involved in
policy decisions as obstacles to judicial involvement, defenders can as-
sert the very means of judicial factfinding as particularly well suited to
policy decisions. The adversarial process arguably ferrets out the truth
more successfully than could any legislative committee. Coupled with
public law litigation and class actions, courts have developed proficiency
in addressing areas of generalized public concern.90 In his article on
public law litigation,9' Abram Chayes posits a number of the court's
other institutional advantages for making broader policy related deci-
sions, including: (1) the judge's likely public policy experience and de-
liberative and reflective disposition;92 (2) extensive participation by
representatives of those affected by the decision; (3) the necessity of ju-
dicial response to complaints of the aggrieved as distinguished from the
legislature or administrative bureaucracy; and (4) efficiency of a non-
bureaucratic entity.93
4. Distinctions of State Courts
State courts may be better suited for interpreting equal education
rights obligations than are federal courts because of differences in (1)
89 See id. It should also be noted that a court's legitimacy might also be buttressed by the
manner in which it renders a verdict and the relationship it sustains with the other branches,
the media and the general populace. Professor Abram Chayes wrote on this matter regarding
public law litigation:
judicial participation is not by the way of sweeping and immutable statements of the
law, but in the form of a continuous and rather tentative dialogue with other political
elements - Congress and the executive, administrative agencies, the profession and
the academics, the press and wider publics. Bentham's "judge and company" has
become a conglomerate. In such a setting, the ability of judicial action to generate
assent over the long haul become[s] the ultimate touchstone of legitimacy.
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1316
(1976).
90 See REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 67, at 13.
91 See Chayes, supra note 89.
92 This observation regards only federal judges. Charles Lopeman finds significantly
more public policy experience in the federal bench than in the state courts. See CHARLES S.
LOPEMAN, THE ACTIVIST ADVOCATE: POLICY MAKING IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 4-5, 8-10
(1999).
93 See Chayes, supra note 89, at 1307-08.
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textual basis; (2) positive rights tradition; (3) flexibility; (4) popular ac-
countability; 94 (5) population size; and (6) amendment processes. Yet
there also remain arguments against state court policy making. Under
one critical view of state courts, Professor Neubome articulates the view
that only Federal courts may effectively uphold individual rights in a
countermajoritarian manner. 95 State courts are not as well suited to as-
serting anti-majoritarian policy determinations due to their inferior com-
petency, 96 which implicates their psychological sense of legitimacy, and
their electoral accountability, 97 which suggests a logical resistance to
contending with the majority. However, Neuborne maintains that state
courts are well suited to addressing positive rights embedded in the state
constitutions.98
In his call for judicial federalism, Justice Brennan made much of the
differences between the state and federal constitutions. Brennan en-
couraged state judges to construe their state constitution provisions re-
garding individual rights even more broadly than their Federal
counterparts.99 Moreover, Brennan argued "the very premise of the
cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear call to state
courts to step into the breach."' 1 Brennan urged state courts to heighten
their scrutiny of state individual rights where Federal Courts had lowered
theirs.'0 1 The Supreme Court Justice also invoked federalism as a basis
94 These four factors are addressed in general in Professor Burt Neuborne's article. See
Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20
RUTGERS L. J. 881, 893 (1989).
95 See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977).
96 See id. at 1124.
97 See id. at 1127.
98 See Neuborne, supra note 94.
99 See William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495-502 (1977). Until recently, however, state courts were not so
inclined to undergo independent state constitutional analysis, and in particular, not an investi-
gation of the state's constitutional history. Moreover, state constitutions do not enjoy the level
of prominence of the United States Constitution, out of which constitutional values might be
said to emanate. This may be due to both state court reluctance to utilize the sources and the
public's ignorance. See Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference Mas-
querading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in State Judicial Review of Education
Finance, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV 231, 286-88 (1998); see also Hans E. Linde, E Pluribus - Consti-
tutional Theory and State Courts, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 273,
278-79 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985) arguing that state courts are less inclined to turn to
state constitutional law because the courts resolve a greater array of legal dilemma than the
Supreme Court, consisting of federal and state statutes, common law, federal case law, sister
state sources and federal constitutional law. A national survey conducted in 1988 found 52%
of respondents did not know their states had a constitution. See Introduction, 20 RUTGERS L.J.
878 (1989).
IOO See Brennan, supra note 99, at 503.
101 See id.
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for state courts developing greater protections for even Federal rights. 10 2
Under Brennan's analysis, Rodriguez should not serve as an obstacle to
equal protection claims brought in State court. Rather, into this breach
must state courts enter.
State court involvement may also be hastened by the insertion of
positive rights into state constitutions. In contrast, the purpose and struc-
ture of the United States Constitution is largely one of negative rights,
protecting the citizenry from the tyranny of government. Indeed, it is
difficult to read the U.S. Constitution as a source of positive rights for
two institutional reasons. First, this would require development of na-
tionwide uniform rules, which the federal courts would have difficulty in
applying given regional differences.' 0 3 Second, the lack of democratic
influence on the federal judiciary makes sense within the realm of nega-
tive rights, where the court's insulation may steel its opposition to gov-
ernment action, but not within positive rights, where the court compels
government action. 10 4
A plausible argument can be made that state court adjudication
within the realm of positive rights raises more issues of separation of
powers because it involves court action in response to legislative inaction
- a behavior more susceptible to charges of judicial tyranny. On the
other hand, the very notion of positive rights focuses not on the tyranni-
cal tendencies of government, as would separation of powers, but rather
obligates it to act beneficently.
Arguably, state court adjudication of positive rights such as educa-
tion is less invasive of the legislative realm. Jonathan Feldman has ob-
served "[w]hen negative rights are violated, the offending legislation
must be struck down, an absolute rebuke to the legislature. When posi-
tive rights are violated, however, the legislative process is set in motion,
which allows for the exercise, albeit within judicially-prescribed bounda-
ries, of legislative power."' 05 However, it is unclear whether a rebuke is
a greater intrusion than continuous judicial oversight over the legislating
and executing of remedial measures.
State courts also often enjoy greater flexibility than their federal
counterparts. State courts are arguably more functionally disposed to ad-
102 See id. Paul W. Kahn views Brennan's federalism as puzzling given the Justice's
common resistance to states' rights arguments in federalism disputes. See Paul W. Kahn,
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993). In
addition, Kahn criticizes notions of individual state constitutional culture, and suggests there
really is one national constitutional culture where state courts generally fall in step with federal
court decisions. See id.
103 See Neubome, supra note 94, at 890.
104 See id.
105 Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights
Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057,
1061 (1993).
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judicating policy matters than Federal courts because there is no Article
III limitation on state courts. 10 6 This constitutional requirement of an
actual "case" or "controversy" before the court enters into a Federal
court's determination of whether a matter is a political question. Absent
this limitation, state courts may more readily find the issue justiciable.
Thus the decision whether to grant jurisdiction becomes entirely
prudential. 10 7
State court involvement with the electorate also makes the state ju-
diciary a more appropriate venue than the federal courts for deciding
issues such as education. Viewing the court as protector against
majoritarian oppression, this role is even more critical in the state con-
text. James Madison observed:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the
distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the
distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the
number of individuals composing a majority, and the
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the
more easily will they concert and execute their plans of
oppression. 10 8
Of course this impetus for a greater role for judiciary involvement
elicits charges of antimajoritarianism. Counseling against that is the fact
that in many states judges are electorally accountable and that judges'
opinions are not as final because of the ease of the amendment process of
state constitutions. The latter point suggests that state courts should be
no less inclined to adjudicate constitutional matters than they would stat-
utory claims. Furthermore antimajoritarian criticism may be muted by
the fact that state constitutions were more recently enacted and directly
ratified by the people. 109
106 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1,2.
107 One commentator suggests that the lack of this constitutional requirement enables
state courts to offer binding advisory opinions in education finance cases, thereby deferring to
the legislature as to remedy, but still upholding state constitutional individual rights. See
George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on the State
School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 543, 563-67 (1994).
108 THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, 83 (Kendall & Carey, eds., 1966).
109 See Blanchard, supra note 99, at 262. But compare Paul Kahn's belief that the state
constitution's accessibility to the populace makes it more likely courts will not enter the policy
realm. He writes:
The argument has been made that because state constitutions are generally of more
recent vintage and are more easily amended than the federal constitution, they pro-
vide a more vital democratic legitimacy to judicial review. In theory, such popular
checks could embolden a court to take risks, to allow its vision of fairness publicly to
compete and to receive a kind of popular legitimation from its own survival. How-
ever, it usually does not work this way. To adjudicate under the threat of popular
20021 419
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III. THE ALLURE OF THE ADEQUACY STANDARD
Reports of the demise of the equality standard and claim have been
greatly exaggerated. 110 Both where adequacy claims have failed and
succeeded litigant and judge have often seen fit to raise equality
concerns. III
Professor Peter Enrich suggests that the continued appeal of the
equality cause of action is due in part to the detritus of "inertia." ' 1 2 In
addition to mere habit, Enrich speculates that equality may enjoy promi-
nence in the education finance courts because of similarly related causes
that invoke the same touchstone. Citation of equality may also owe
much to doubts concerning the sufficiency of adequacy claims. Finally,
and not unrelated to the "inertia" rationale, Enrich points both to equal-
ity's normative force in our idea of a just society and its apparent sim-
plicity as reasons for its continued reference." 13
While Enrich's explanations of equality's staying power are quite
plausible many education finance cases over the last twelve or so years
have dealt with the newer standard of adequacy. Adequacy claims have
often arisen in state courts that had previously rejected challenges to the
state education finance system on equality claims.' 14 The change in
strategy was a necessary response to a court's previous resistance to
equality arguments. Still, it remains noteworthy how much of the lan-
guage and even the arguments remained the same, whether under the
rubric of equality or adequacy. 51 5 In order to best understand the way
things have changed and stayed the same it is necessary to examine why
courts may have resisted equality arguments, been receptive to adequacy
claims, and why often there is little difference between the two.
politics is to be reminded of the countermajoritarian burdens of judicial activism. It
is a reminder of the contested character of what it means to be fair. It serves, there-
fore, as yet another force pushing toward judicial deference to political decisions.
See Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 Val. U. L. Rev.
459, 471 (1996). New York's current constitution has been in effect since 1895 and was
amended 207 times between 1895 and 1991. See Gerald Benjamin & Melissa Cusa, Constitu-
tional Amendment through the Legislature in New York, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE
STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND HISTORICAL PATrERNS 53 (G. Alan Tarred.,
1996). Comparable statistics for other states and their respective constitutions may be found in
Donald S. Lutz, Patterns in the Amending of American State Constitutions. See id. at 32-34
(Table 2.1 listing basic data on state constitutions' amendments). Thus, New York state's
constitutional history and the CFE and Levittown decisions reveal both support for and oppo-
sition to Blanchard's and Kahn's views. See infra IV.A.B.
110 See Enrich, supra note 15, at 128-43; see also Patt supra note 18, at 563-87.
111 Some commentators dispute that third wave cases have succeeded due to reliance on
the adequacy claim. They point to shifts in popular sentiment regarding education. See Patt,
supra note 18, at 573; see also Heise, supra note 14, at 1175.
112 See Enrich, supra note 15, at 143.
113 See id.
114 See Heise, supra note 57.
115 See Patt, supra note 18.
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A. WEAKNESSES OF EQUALITY
Equality challenges address different components of education and
its state financing. The equalization sought may apply to the disparity
between districts' tax capacity, actual expenditures, quality of educa-
tional services, or quality of educational outcomes.'1 16 The first difficulty
attendant upon any of these measures of equality is complexity. Tax
capacity and expenditures elicit a continual debate over the relevance of
financial input to educational output. 1 7 Education services and out-
comes remain plagued by debate over how to measure at all.' 18 All four
methods are subject to arguments that inequalities cannot be simply at-
tributed to state legislative decisions but to a myriad of factors, most
notably socio-economic background of students. 119
The second difficulty attendant to an equality argument is its en-
croachment on wealthier districts. 20 If equality means uniformity in
spending, districts with more favorable tax bases may have their own
local spending restricted. Such "dumbing down" is anathema to many a
person's sense of fairness. If a district chooses to place a certain level of
importance on education spending, why should this prerogative be de-
nied? If not restricted in its own spending, a wealthy district might be
taxed more heavily to raise the poorer districts' education spending to a
level equal to that of the wealthy district. Such financing schemes raise
criticisms of unequal treatment and concerns over violation of local
control.
Local control may also stand alone as a third critical weakness in
the equality argument. Dressed in the incandescent light of neutrality
local control appeals to many as the most formidable response to equali-
zation. Each district should be permitted its own autonomy and deci-
sions on spending. Such arguments resonate on the most primal level of
parent-child relationships. A court may not be inclined to dictate that the
state must determine entirely how or to what extent a child may be edu-
116 See id. at 145-51.
117 See Martha Minow, School Finance: Does Money Matter?, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGis.
395 (1991).
118 The standards-based movement is the current popular method. Many characterize the
process, particularly with regard to student outcomes as entirely test-driven. Recently, Presi-
dent George W. Bush has proposed a Federal program including such testing. See David E.
Sanger, Bush Pushes Ambitious Education Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2001, at Al.
119 This is a constant theme in many state defenses: Schools take students as they find
them. Students themselves are not equal and hence schools cannot be blamed for not making
them all equal. Of particular potency has been the now thirty-five year old Coleman Report,
which found student success attributable to other factors besides money, such as parents' edu-
cation level, wealth, and involvement in school. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, ET AL., U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 290-302
(1966).
120 See Enrich, supra note 15, at 156-58.
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cated.' 21 Finally, advocates of local control fear that the necessity of
equalization of education will require subsequent application in other ar-
eas of commonly enjoyed local control such as garbage collection and
recreational services. 1 22
The concerns above, particularly with respect to local control, were
all articulated in Rodriguez and to some extent in Milliken. Local control
remains a cross of gold that too many states will not tread upon. How-
ever, local control may be attacked on the grounds that it is an unfair
illusion for property poor districts. No matter what discretionary actions
a poor district takes, its local school funding cannot match that of its
wealthy counterparts. 123
It then falls on the states to compensate for these discrepancies.
Since the Rodriguez decision so colored many states' readings of their
own constitutions' equal protection clauses, equality arguments could
only trump local control on education clause grounds. 124 However, with
the exception of a few state constitutions, 25 most states do not readily
permit conferral of a fundamental right status on education. Thus equal-
ity arguments require some liberal textual construction. Depending on
the clause's language and court's interpretive bent a fairly loose reading
may be required.
The difficulty in textual readings is the fourth significant weakness
attributed to equality claims. 126 Where a requirement of equal funding,
for example, may be interpreted from an education clause, such an obli-
gation on the state might not be permitted if the subsequent funding
formula and scheme violated other constitutional clauses regarding local
control of property taxes. 127 The greater challenge may be, however, to
even interpret an obligation of equal funding from the education clause
121 See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 139-48 (1999).
122 See Enrich, supra note 15, at 161.
123 This argument was made most forcefully in Serrano regarding the illusion of local
control for poor districts. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260 (Cal. 1971).
124 In addition, where an equality argument might be principally based on the state's
equal protection clause rather than an education clause, the specificity of a potentially less
expansive state right to education clause would take precedence over the general equality
clause in constitutional interpretation, thereby inhibiting the constitutional equality argument.
See Enrich, supra note 15, at 163.
125 William E. Thro considers these states to include Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Michigan,
Missouri, New Hampshire, and Washington. In his analysis of state education clauses Profes-
sor Thro developed four categories of state constitutional language. His taxonomy may serve
as a prognostic aid for education finance litigation. Category I clauses reveal only a slight
state duty to provide education. Category II clauses state certain standards, while category III
provisions have more specific and stronger language regarding the state duty. Finally category
IV clauses read so as to easily infer education a fundamental right. See William E. Thro, To
Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance
Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639 (1989).
126 See Enrich, supra note 15, at 162-66.
127 See id. at 163.
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alone. Given the dominant precedent Rodriguez still holds over even
state constitution equal protection clause interpretation in terms of educa-
tion, the furtive search for equality in education clauses may be the only
chance for a constitutionally required equal education.128
B. STRENGTHS OF ADEQUACY
Where state courts might have resisted invalidating state education
finance schemes due to notions of judicial restraint from interference in
the business of the coordinate political departments, some litigants attrib-
uted these failures to reliance on equality standards.' 2 9 One fault in the
equality standard was that it entailed expansive and liberal interpretation
of constitutional provisions. Such necessarily broad interpretation might
suggest the matter was a nonjusticiable political question. Vague equal-
ity arguments could often evince charges of "a lack of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards for resolving it..." 130 If equality was
susceptible to charges that the claim lacked textual basis and a coherent
means of measurement, then adequacy was hoped to. resolve these
criticisms.
The principal support for an adequacy standard is that it is clearly
textually embedded in each state's education clause. 131 Thus the judicial
inquiry may simply involve inquiring whether the state has fulfilled the
textual mandate as articulated in the education clause. Proponents argue
the adequacy inquiry contrasts with the equality argument, which either
required the two-step process of also examining the equal protection
clause and/or then discerning a specific requirement of equality in the
education clause, and all of the attendant difficulties with such a process
as outlined above. 132
The second advantage of the adequacy argument is its exclusivity.
Unlike equality, which may be applied as a measure of all government
services, adequacy, as rooted in the education clauses, serves to only
calibrate the constitutionality of education. Thus, local leaders need not
fear the extension of this measurement to other realms of local
government. 33
Third, adequacy appeals to many because it appears to only promise
a "floor" criteria and no "ceiling" for education funding.134 In contrast to
equality, which suggests to many an inevitable restriction on maximum
128 The taxonomy of state constitution education clauses suggests the difficulty with such
a process. See Thro, supra note 125.
129 See Heise, supra note 57.
130 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
131 See Enrich, supra note 15, at 166.
132 See id. at 166-67.
133 See id. at 168
134 See id.
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amount of funding, adequacy merely requires a minimal level of funding
to be in accord with the constitution. Thus adequacy arguments are not
susceptible to as many fears of the wealthy or local control advocates. 135
Adequacy would appear to require a less comparative assessment than
inheres to equality.
The Rose v. Council for Better Education136 Kentucky Supreme
Court decision illustrates many of the critical components of the ade-
quacy standard. First, the court began with the Kentucky constitutional
provision requiring the legislature to "provide for an efficient system of
common schools throughout the State." 137 Notably the court recognized
education as a fundamental right under its state constitution (a step not
necessarily taken by all state courts that have employed the adequacy
standard). Second, the court studied educational data including compara-
tive test scores and drop-out rates. 138 Third, the court examined the
state's education spending in comparison to the rest of the nation.139 Fi-
nally, the court did not simply hold that the funding of Kentucky schools
was unconstitutional, but that the entire education system was constitu-
tionally inadequate.' 40 The court stated "an adequate education must
have as its goal the development within each child of seven basic
capacities." 14 1
Providing a primarily substantive and expansive definition permit-
ted the court to remain within the traditional domain of judicial interpre-
tation (albeit liberal) yet provide some general framework from which
the legislature could then act. One participant in the Kentucky school
finance case noted that the adequacy standard as
used by the court enabled it to define the intent of the
constitution, set forth constitutional guidelines, and com-
pel legislative adherence without seriously encroaching
on legislative powers .... The court's unique approach
in effecting the comprehensive invalidation of the entire
system tended to preserve legislative autonomy rather
than to diminish it, and in so doing the court was able to
maintain the proper balance in the separation of
powers. 142
135 See id.
136 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
137 Id. at 216.
138 See id. at 197.
139 See id.
140 See id. at 215.
141 Id. at 212; see also supra Section I. B. 3.
142 Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority:
The Kentucky Case, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 364-65 (1991).
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The "guidelines" holding facilitated a quick legislative response in-
cluding tax legislation that resulted in significant increases in public
school funding for all schools, ranging from 8% changes in the richest
districts to 25% growth in the poorest. 143
C. ADEQUACY'S WEAKNESSES
Adjudicating adequacy claims requires courts to insert themselves
firmly in the educational realm. The first step in the deliberative process
involves defining an adequate education. Where equality claims mainly
demanded an inquiry into disparity of economic inputs, the adequacy
claims necessitate a more complex and expansive analysis. A substan-
tive definition of an adequate education requires a prescription of some
minimum inputs into schools, but also of outputs from schools. The
composition of these inputs and outputs is not self-evident under ade-
quacy analysis. Rather than confine itself to measurements of dollars
inserted into a school district as compared to another district, the ade-
quacy standard invites measurements of many education sectors, includ-
ing but not limited to teacher experience, classroom size, reading levels,
and enrichment programs, in addition to state funding. These different
facets of education undergo an interdependent analysis. For example, the
minimum adequate levels of a reading score (output) inform the requisite
number of dollars to be spent (input). It is unclear whether these levels
of achievement outputs are to be derived from standardized tests, state-
wide average school scores, nationwide average school scores, legisla-
tively determined educational goals, or simply judicial fiat.
Whether an adequacy standard provides an easier ground of consti-
tutional interpretation than equality certainly warrants further discussion.
Just what constitutes an adequate education would appear to have far less
constitutional basis than what constitutes an equal education. Any meth-
odological difficulties encountered in measuring equality remain with ad-
equacy and are arguably even more pronounced.
Applying the equality standard is largely a comparative process,
well suited to the court's competency and legitimacy. The process of
defining an adequate education requires the court to delve into the more
creative policy realm of the legislature, at the very least raising questions
as to institutional propriety and capability. While the Rose decision ap-
peared to enjoy positive legislative as well as popular response, one must
not ignore that the court found education to be a fundamental right. 144
Such a holding brought many of the equality arguments to the fore. This
143 See id. at 343 n.80.
144 See 790 S.W.2d 215.
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practice of merging equality standards into the adequacy argument re-
mains common.
Arguments that adequacy claims provide refuge from the local con-
trol concerns raised by equality causes of action are of questionable va-
lidity. Given a state's limited budget and resources, a judicial order that
all districts must fund at a minimum level may often interfere with the
state funding of wealthy districts. A state may need to raise the percent-
age of money it allots to poorer districts to achieve the adequate level.
Hence, the percentage of that likely finite amount of state funding will
diminish the coffers of the wealthy districts which are already well above
the adequate floor. While the wealthy district may choose to increase its
own local funding, the adequacy mandate would infringe on the previ-
ously enjoyed local spending amount.
It is the very palatability of adequacy claims to wealthy districts that
may give one pause to endorse this approach. While adequacy may re-
ceive less legislative resistance because a verdict against the state does
not require leveling funding, the verdict would not heal the disparities
between districts and their students. As many courts have noted, educa-
tion serves the purpose of enabling students to compete in the workplace.
The workplace does not remain intradistrict forever. Presumably, even
where all children receive an adequate education, the inequities permitted
would no doubt produce students who could always outperform their
peers who had received inferior educations, however adequate they may
have been. The most significant weakness of the adequacy argument is
that it often presumes segregated, localized worlds.' 45
Finally, the adequacy argument lacks the very normative force of
equality. To disparage the latter as merely rhetorical is inaccurate. Ade-
quacy arguments, for their very circumscribed specificity in education,
may diminish the importance of education to society and preserve inequi-
table disparities. Justice Marshall recognized this anomaly in his dissent
in Rodriguez:
Even if the Equal Protection Clause encompassed some
theory of constitutional adequacy, discrimination in the
provision of educational opportunity would certainly
seem to be a poor candidate for its application. Neither
the majority nor appellants inform us how judicially
145 The emphasis on continued segregated improvement of schools is Professor Ryan's
fundamental criticism of education finance reform strategies. Ryan suggests a strategy to im-
prove schools by encouraging integration; such efforts may even include a voucher system.
The courts' acceptance of the continued state of segregated schools, no matter how "adequate"
each may be, demonstrates the continuing hold Milliken still has on courts and society today.
Ryan's argument is underscored by much recent data suggesting a strong correlation between
successful student outcomes and integrated classrooms. See Ryan, supra note 23, at 307.
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manageable standards are to be derived for determining
how much education is enough to "excuse" constitu-
tional discrimination. One would think that the majority
would heed its own fervent affirmation of judicial self-
restraint before undertaking the complex task of deter-
mining at large what level of education is constitution-
ally sufficient.
In my view, then, it is inequality - not some notion of
gross inadequacy - of educational opportunity that raises
a question of denial of equal protection of the laws. I
find any other approach to the issue unintelligible and
without directing principle. 46
Equality arguments raise education to that more fundamental perch.
Equality does not defer simply to the whims of the legislature. State
courts should recall the Supreme Court's famous words in Brown: "it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if
he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms."' 47 Whether in the guise of adequacy
arguments or not, state courts should not ignore the Supreme Court's
rhetoric of equality.
IV. THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE: FROM EQUALITY
TO ADEQUACY
On January 10, 2001 a New York trial court ruled that the New
York state education system was unconstitutional.1 48 The court ruled
that the funding system was invalid on both adequacy and equality
grounds. First, Judge DeGrasse found that New York had failed to pro-
vide adequate funding to assure New York City students a "sound basic
education" guaranteed by the New York State Constitution Education
Article. 149 Second, the court found the system unequal due to its "ad-
verse and disparate impact upon the city's minority public school stu-
dents," thus violating the specific implementing regulations of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.150
The trial court verdict was hailed by many as a necessary decision
that had been too long in coming. Meanwhile, Governor Pataki prom-
146 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 1, 89-90 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
147 347 U.S. at 493.
148 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 187 Misc.2d 1 (N.Y. Sup. 2001).
149 See id. at 3.
150 See id.
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ised to appeal the decision. 51 The verdict was not merely the culmina-
tion of a case begun back in May of 1993 but rather may be seen as the
evolution of a different set of claims brought in a separate case from
1982.
In order to best understand how the court ruled as it did, it is neces-
sary to understand why the very claims the court decided even material-
ized at all. The very substance of the plaintiffs' claims in CFE v. New
York owe much to the earlier New York Court of Appeals decision on
the legitimacy of these claims in 1995152 and must be traced back to the
1982 New York Court of Appeals Levittown v. Nyquist'53 decision which
upheld the education financing system on different grounds. In addition,
facts outside of the courtroom also contributed to the possibility of ruling
the education finance system unconstitutional. With the New York As-
sembly's assumption of a larger role in education and the rise of the
standards based movement, the adequacy argument became more palat-
able and less intrusive to the legislature. 154
A. LEVITTOWN V. NYQUIST
The plaintiffs in the Levittown case included a number of property
poor districts as well as intervenors from four of the largest cities in the
state. 155 The plaintiffs contended that the public school financing system
violated the State and Federal Equal Protection Clauses as well as the
State Education Article because the system resulted in "grossly disparate
financial support (and thus grossly disparate educational opportunities) in
the school districts of the state."'156 The Court of Appeals candidly ac-
knowledged the inequalities in availability of financial aid and accepted
the argument that such disparity in aid correlated with the unequal qual-
151 See Richard Perez-Pena with Abby Goodnough, Pataki to Appeal Decision by Judge
on Aid to Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at Al. This case was just argued before the First
Department, Appellate Division, on October 25, 2001. A decision is expected within two to
four months.
152 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995).
153 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982).
154 See Richard Rothstein, The Unforeseen Costs of Raising Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
11, 2001, at B4.
155 See 439 N.E.2d 359, 361-62.
156 Id. The property poor districts argued that the system's dependence on property taxes
enabled property-rich districts to raise more local tax revenue permitting them to provide edu-
cational services beyond the fiscal ability of poor districts. The intervenors did not cite prop-
erty tax inequities as the source of disparate education services but pointed to four factors
peculiar to cities: (1) municipal budgets required local funds for certain noneducation purposes
("municipal overburden"); (2) disparate regional costs which adversely affected the municipal
dollar's value; (3) greater student absenteeism which diminished the State aid that was deter-
mined on the basis of daily attendance; and (4) larger concentrations of students with special
education needs and hence higher costs. See id. at 362.
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ity and quantity of educational opportunity.157 However, at the outset of
the opinion, the court noted that no claim was made that the quality or
quantity of education in the property poor districts or the urban regions
was below that of the minimum standard set by the Board of Regents. 158
Such distinctions bear significant relevance to the differences between
the equality and adequacy arguments and may well have served as a road
map of sorts for the later education finance challenge.
1. The Equal Protection Claims
The court held that under San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez
the Federal Constitutional Equal Protection claim failed.159 The court
dismissed the intervenors' "metropolitan overburden" claims on the
grounds that "the cited inequalities existing in cities are the product of
demographic, economic, and political factors intrinsic to the cities them-
selves, and cannot be attributed to legislative action or inaction."'160 The
court's reluctance to lay responsibility for the disparity on the legislature
may indicate some doubt as to the prudence of judicial pronouncement
on financing schools. Though the court found the system constitutional,
undergirding the decision may likely have been concerns of
nonjusticiability. 161
The court of appeals also found the education financing system did
not violate the New York Constitution Equal Protection Clause. 162 The
court, citing Rodriguez as well as New York precedent, applied the ra-
tional basis test to determine the validity of the educational funding and
opportunity disparity. 163 The court found preserving and promoting lo-
cal control of education to be a legitimate government interest reasonably
related to the financing system, thereby justifying district disparities. 164
157 See id. at 363 n.3.
158 See id. at 363.
159 See id. at 364. The dissent sought to distinguish this case from Rodriguez, arguing
that this case presented a different claim that the statute authorized inequitable state school
financing based upon incorrect calculations of needs and funding capacities of city districts.
See id. at 375.
160 Id. at 365.
161 The Court of Appeals questioned whether it even had the jurisdiction to declare the
entire funding system unconstitutional, at the very least because of the attendant difficulties of
creating remedies and implementation. The court did however, suggest that clearly justiciable
issues would include legislative appropriations of state aid to localities owing to legislative
determinations of geographic boundaries of districts and authorization of the districts' real
property taxation. See id. at 364.
162 See id. at 366.
163 See id. at 365. The trial court had applied a standard of strict scrutiny under which
that court found the system invalid. The Appellate Division applied intermediate scrutiny and
also found the system unconstitutional. See id.
164 See id. at 366.
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In contrast, the dissent would have upheld the Appellate Division's
application of intermediate scrutiny and found the education finance sys-
tem violated the New York Equal Protection Clause. 65 According to the
dissent the funding disparities were unconstitutional because (1) equality
of educational opportunity was an important State constitutional interest;
(2) the disparities were due to classifications based upon the property
wealth of districts; (3) given limited local tax bases, preserving and pro-
moting autonomy through local control is implausible; and (4) the State
had not shown that the local interests could not be achieved by less intru-
sive means. 166
The court dismissed the contention that the state constitution's in-
clusion of an education clause demanded heightened equal protection
scrutiny. The court suggested such an argument would apply to Federal
Constitutional analysis but not to the state constitution. The court distin-
guished the state constitution as a document that did not contain an ex-
haustive list of state powers, and thus the items contained in the
constitution did not represent a "hierarchy of values" and should not be
afforded more significance for equal protection analysis. 167 The problem
inherent with this argument is it would appear to place the state constitu-
tion on the same level as statutory obligations. Under such a view of the
state constitution, the significance of any constitutional provision is thus
placed in doubt. In addition, the dissent suggested that the Tenth
Amendment's reservation of all nondelegated powers to the States gives
the State Constitution's Education Article added significance. Given the
absence of an education provision in the Federal Constitution, the State
Constitution did not have to articulate this obligation. Thus its very ex-
plicit textual citation suggests the importance the State Constitution
framers placed on education. 168
2. The State Education Clause Claim
The New York Education Clause reads: "The legislature shall pro-
vide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools, wherein all the children of the state may be educated."1 69 Re-
fusing the gloss of legislative history and loose textual construction, the
court found the state public school financing system did not violate the
educational clause.' 70 The majority noted the clause does not refer to
165 See id. at 374 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
166 See id. at 375.
167 See id. at 374 n.5.
168 See id. at 370.
169 N.Y. CoNsr. art XI, § 1. W.E. Thro places the New York Education Article in Cate-
gory I of his taxonomy of State education clauses, indicating the relative difficulty to infer
significant duties and rights from the clause. See Thro, supra note 125, at 1662.
170 See Bd. of Educ. of Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 (N.Y. 1982).
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equal education, nor does it foreclose districts from making education
expenditures exceeding those of other districts, nor does it abolish local
control. 17 1 The court also observed that the clause was crafted in 1894 at
a time when there were 11,000 local school districts across the state with
varying property wealth and educational opportunity. 72
Denying any constitutional mandate of equality of education, the
court of appeals found that the clause required "a State-wide system as-
suring minimal acceptable facilities and services."'173 Thus, the court
constructed a largely structural inquiry regarding the constitutional valid-
ity of the education system, seemingly without any adjectival compo-
nent. The inquiry is twofold, simply asking: (1) whether there is a
system in place providing education; and (2) whether what is being pro-
vided is in fact an education.
The state may easily fulfill the systemic component by providing a
structure that simply exceeds "unsystematized delivery of instruction." 174
The court then defined the constitutional requirement of education as "a
sound basic education," and found that the fact that New York's average
per pupil expenditures exceeded those of all but two states demonstrated
the state did meet the constitutional obligation. 175
In dissent, Judge Fuchsberg utilized legislative history to craft a
more expansive interpretation of the education clause and applied a more
rigorous standard by which to measure state education financing. 176 The
dissent noted that the spokesman for the Education Committee of the
Constitutional Convention regarded the Education Article as "'more im-
portant to the people of the State, to every man, woman and child in the
State, than any other article that has been under consideration in this
Convention.' ' ' 177 Moreover, a preliminary report on an Education
amendment stated "'the first great duty of the State is to protect and
foster its educational interests.' "178 The report went on to add that "[n]o
desire to confine the new Constitution to the narrowest possible limits of
space should prevent the adoption of an enactment declaring in the
strongest possible terms the interest of the State in its common
171 See id. at 368.
172 See id.
173 Id.
174 Id. The court understood "system" to only apply to "a system of free common
schools," i.e. education, and not to maintenance and support. Such an interpretation precludes
a view of the education clause as requiring a systemic, i.e. uniform and equal maintenance and
support, i.e. financing, of education. See id. at 369 n.7.
175 See id. at 369.
176 See id. at 371. In what may be characterized as executive contemporary reporting, the
dissent also noted that in response to the lower courts' decisions the Governor had proposed a
program to achieve "equal educational opportunity." See id. at 370.
177 Id. at 371.
178 Id.
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schools." ' 179 Though interpreting the education clause as a far more
stringent demand on the quality of education, even under the standard of
"sound and basic education" the dissent would have found the current
education finance system unconstitutional. 180 Judge Fuchsberg further
argued that as acceptable education levels have risen over the century the
constitutional requirements must maintain their relevance. Advocating a
dynamic interpretation of the Education Article, Fuchsberg envisioned
the Federal Constitution as the floor for individual rights while the State
Constitution could build the ceiling.181
3. The Political Question
Throughout the opinion the court demonstrated its ambivalence over
the justiciability of this matter. The majority characterized the ultimate
issue before the court as "a disciplined perception of the proper role of
the courts in the resolution of our State's educational problems, and to
that end, more specifically, judicial discernment of the reach of the man-
dates of our State Constitution in this regard."'182 The court disparaged
invalidating the education finance system on inequality grounds as re-
sult-oriented and trespassing on the legislative domain. Such judicial ac-
tions ignore separation of powers concerns, disrespect the legislature,
and deprive the court of its neutral position. 83
Having articulated a fairly minimal standard of "sound basic educa-
tion," which will rarely require judicial intrusion, the court emphasized
its separation of powers concerns by stressing its hesitancy to void legis-
lative educational financing decisions. The court explained:
Because decisions as to how public funds will be allo-
cated among the several services for which by constitu-
tional imperative the legislature is required to make
provision are matters peculiarly appropriate for formula-
tion by the legislative body (reflective of and responsive
as it is to the public will), we would be reluctant to over-
ride those decisions by mandating an even higher prior-
ity for education in the absence, possibly, of gross and
glaring inadequacy - something not shown to exist in
consequence of the present school financing system.' 84
Citing anti-majoritarian anxiety, the court appeared largely con-
cerned with prudential considerations implicating its own institutional le-
179 Id.
180 See id. at 373, 375.
181 See id. at 374.
182 Id. at 370.
183 See id.
184 Id. at 369
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gitimacy rather than competency. The reference to "gross and glaring
inadequacy" evinces a remarkably low standard for the legislature to
meet in order to escape judicial intervention. It is unclear what consti-
tutes such a low level of education that would resist judicial deference to
the legislature.
B. CFE v. NEw YORK
Cognizant of the obstacles created by the Levittown decision, in
1993 the Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. (CFE)185 brought a cause of
action in the State Supreme Court in Manhattan, alleging the state educa-
tion finance system denied New York City students the opportunity for a
basic sound education.' 86 Citing Rodriguez and Levittown, the court
struck down the plaintiffs' Federal and State Equal Protection claims.' 87
In addition, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims based on Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 due to a lack of any allegations of discrimi-
natory intent.' 88 The court decision permitted an adequacy argument to
be made that the financing system did not provide for an opportunity of
an education satisfying minimum requirements. The court also permitted
the plaintiffs' claim under implementing regulations of the Federal De-
partment of Education under Title VI, which did not require discrimina-
tory intent but rather disparate impact.1 89
1. The 1995 Court of Appeals Decision
In 1995 the matter came before the New York Court of Appeals on
an appeal from the Appellate Division, which had granted the State's
motions to dismiss CFE's Education Article claim because it did not al-
lege a violation as so defined in Levittown, as well as a motion to dismiss
CFE's Title VI cause of action. The Court of Appeals found the plain-
185 CFE is a coalition of school boards, community organizations, and advocacy groups.
See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 162 Misc.2d 493 (1994).
186 See id.
187 See id. at 499.
188 See id.
189 See id. at 499-500. The factual allegations of these claims were also quite similar to
those in Levittown. The same injuries encapsulated in the "municipal overburden" term were
asserted here. Importantly, the plaintiffs' discriminatory impact claim involved allegations
that 74% of New York State's minority students attend city school, that these students consti-
tute 81% of the city school enrollment in contrast with 17% of school enrollment in the rest of
the state, and that the city's minority students receive 12% less aid than the State average. In
addition, the city comprises 37% of State students but receives only 34% of all State education
financing. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661, 670, n.9 (N.Y.
1995).
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tiffs had pleaded sustainable claims under the Education Article and Title
VI's implementing regulations.190
a. Defining the Adequacy Standard
The court made clear that Levittown did not preclude the plaintiffs'
claim because the present adequacy argument was precisely what that
court stated was not before it in 1982.191 Whether the plaintiffs' ade-
quacy claim was in fact a viable cause of action was the critical question
before the Court of Appeals. Without any explanation of its rationale the
court then proceeded to greatly expand upon the Levittown decision's
construction of the Education Article. The court elaborated upon what
constituted a sound and basic education, stating
[s]uch an education should consist of the basic literacy,
calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable chil-
dren to eventually function productively as civic partici-
pants capable of voting and serving on a jury. If the
physical facilities and pedagogical services and re-
sources made available under the present system are ade-
quate to provide children with the opportunity to obtain
these essential skills, the State will have satisfied its con-
stitutional obligation. 192
While the Court of Appeals exegesis added many words to guide a
legislature's and a court's judgment, the substance of skills necessary for
productive civic participation remained elusive.
Recalling the Levittown reference to "minimum State-wide educa-
tional standards established by the Board of Regents and the Commis-
sioner of Education," CFE proposed an adequacy standard based on the
state's own Regents Learning Standards and standardized competency
examinations. 193 The Court of Appeals resisted such arguments, charac-
terizing some of the Regents' standards as "aspirational," and advising
190 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661, 663 (N.Y. 1995). The
majority held the community school board plaintiffs lacked capacity to sue and dismissed all
claims made on behalf of community school board plaintiffs. See id. at 663 n.1.
191 See id. at 665. See also Bd. of Educ. of Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363
(N.Y. 1982) (observing that "no claim is advanced in this case ... that the educational facili-
ties or services provided in the school districts... fall below the State-wide minimum standard
of educational quality and quantity").
192 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 655 N.E.2d at 666. The court went on to
require "minimally adequate physical facilities" to provide sufficient light, space, heat, and air.
"Minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning" must include desks, chairs, pencils and
"reasonably current textbooks". The court also required a "minimally adequate teaching of
reasonably up-to-date curricula ... by sufficient personnel adequately trained." See id.
193 See id.
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"prudence should govern utilization of the Regents' standards as
benchmarks of educational adequacy."'' 94
Finally, the Court of Appeals made clear that it could not and would
not determine what constitutes a sound and basic education at such an
early stage in the proceedings. This responsibility would fall back upon
the State Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals explained that "[o]nly
after discovery and the development of a factual record can this issue be
fully evaluated and resolved. Rather, we articulate a template reflecting
our judgment of what the trier of fact must consider in determining
whether defendants have met their constitutional obligation." 195 The
trial court must determine whether students in the plaintiffs' districts re-
ceive the opportunity to obtain the requisite skills for productive juror
and voter duty. Finally, the trial judge must find "a causal link between
the present funding system and any proven failure to provide a sound
basic education to New York City school children."' 196 Delegating the
responsibility of defining a "sound and basic education" to the trial court
on the grounds that it was a fact laden decision obfuscates the court's
probable discomfort with the substantive education policy component
underlying the adequacy cause of action.
Notwithstanding the potential anxiety, the court departed from the
limited Levittown understanding of what constituted a sound basic educa-
tion and its restriction of judicial involvement in the realm of education
policy. In his concurrence, Judge Levine found the adequacy claim le-
gally sufficient but took great exception to the majority's template or
expansion of the Levittown definition of education. 197 Judge Levine cau-
tioned the majority's standard "invites and inevitably will entail the sub-
jective, unverifiable educational policy making by Judges, unreviewable
on any principled basis, which was anathema to the Levittown Court."' 98
Similar separation of powers concerns were articulated even more
strongly in the dissent. Judge Simons criticized the majority's creation
of the new adequacy standard on five grounds. Simons first echoed the
Levittown political question contention that courts should generally not
intrude on constitutional responsibilities delegated to the legislature and
executive unless they did not "establish a State-wide system of education
and fund it."'199 The dissent considered this duty fulfilled so long as the
structure of education was created. Only this duty was reviewable by the
court. The majority's new standard, however, is qualitative, enabling the
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 667.
t97 See id. at 671.
198 Id. at 675 (Levine, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 681 (Simons, J., dissenting).
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court to both define the substantive standard of education and to review
its implementation by the other branches. 2°°
Second, the legislature is best suited to make education aid evalua-
tions due to its responsibilities of reviewing education needs and distrib-
uting resources including financial assistance. Given the ample
representation of New York City in the State Assembly, the legislature
must be aware of the inferior qualitative status of education opportunity
in the city. Absent a judicial finding that the funding is "grossly inade-
quate" the courts should not force states to do more.20'
Third, the Education Article does not provide an individual constitu-
tional right but prescribes a general duty. Reiterating his understanding
of the Education Article as assigning a solely structural obligation and
not a qualitative one, Judge Simons stated "[t]he Constitution is satisfied
if the majority has worked its will through its elected officials and their
action represents a reasonable response to the duty imposed. ' '20 2 Since
the Education Article imposes an obligation on the government rather
than providing an individual entitlement, the court cannot be justified in
placing qualitative burdens on the state.
Fourth, judicially compelling greater funding of education en-
croaches on the legislature's appropriations powers. 20 3 The dissent ar-
gued that either a general increase in education funding or a specific
reallocation of funds to New York City would interfere with the legisla-
ture's power to determine State priorities and distribute resources. 20 4 Fi-
nally, the dissent expressed the concern that the court's assumption of
qualitative judicial oversight of educational opportunity sets a precedent
for other areas of government service ranging from ski trails to nursing
homes.205
Thus the fundamental attack on sustaining the adequacy claim was
entirely motivated by the dissent's concerns over judicial legitimacy and
capacity. Notwithstanding the changes on the Court of Appeals over
thirteen years, these anxieties regarding political question doctrine and
justiciability appear more pronounced in the wake of this adequacy claim
as opposed to the earlier equality cause of action. Doubtless, the rhetoric
is often more pitched in dissent than in a majority opinion, but the con-
cerns may in fact have a greater validity in the context of adequacy rather
than equality. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Judge Simons did not dissent
from the part of the majority's opinion sustaining a cause of action alleg-
200 See id. at 676.
201 See id. at 681.
202 Id.
203 See id.
204 See id.
205 See id. at 682.
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ing violation of the Title VI implementing regulations. 2° 6 Hence the dis-
sent was immunized from attacks charging result-oriented jurisprudence.
Simons would entertain claims that the education finance system does
have a disproportionate impact on minority children.
b. The Equality in Title VI Implementing Regulations
As with so many of the heralded third wave cases, the adequacy
claim of CFE v. New York appears unable to shirk its predecessor claim
of equality. Here, however, the equality claim is neither rooted in Fed-
eral or State Equal Protection Clause nor in the New York Education
Article, but rather derives from a Federal statute.
Title VI prohibits discrimination "on the ground of race, color, or
national origin... under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance. °2 0 7 The difficulty inherent in a Title VI claim is it re-
quires proof of intent to discriminate. 20 8 However, the plaintiffs also
alleged a violation of the United States Department of Education's regu-
lations implementing Title VI.209 Though the regulations address the
same nature of and substantive discrimination as Title VI itself, the regu-
lations do not require proof of discriminatory intent to sustain an action.
Rather, "[p]roof of discriminatory effect suffices to establish liability
under the regulations promulgated pursuant to title VI... ,"210 In addi-
tion, the plaintiffs must also show that the practice having this adverse
effect is not "adequately justified. '21 1 Even where the State may prove a
legitimate reason, the plaintiffs can still prevail if they demonstrate less
discriminatory means could have achieved the State's interests.
2 12
The Court of Appeals sustained CFE's implementing regulations
cause of action because it met the two components of a valid claim.
21 3
First, plaintiffs alleged a disparity of total and per capita education
spending between the minority students of New York City and the
nonminority students of the rest of the State.2 14 Second, the State did not
aver any justification for the disparity. 2 15
206 See id. at 676.
207 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
208 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d at 669.
209 See id. at 661; 34 CFR 100.3 [b] [2].
210 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d at 669.
211 Id. at 670.
212 See id.
213 As recipient of Federal Funds for education New York was within the ambit of these
regulations.
214 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d at 670. The State always contended that
it was the City that was at fault for any disparate impact. The State argued it merely distrib-
uted funds to the city, which was then responsible for allocation to the various districts. See id.
215 See id.
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c. The Trial Court Decision
Some five years, 111 trial court days, 72 witnesses, and 4,300 docu-
ments later, the New York State Supreme Court ruled the State education
finance system unconstitutional. This holding was based upon the Edu-
cation Article adequacy claim. The court also held the plaintiffs had es-
tablished their Federal Law claim of discrimination under the Title VI
implementing regulations. With respect to remedies the court returned
the matter to the legislature and executive for resolution of a new financ-
ing system. Such a gesture was a pyrrhic victory at best for foes of judi-
cial intervention. The court abjured the State to have crafted a new
system by September 15, 2001 when the court would judge its viabil-
ity. 21 6 The fences between the branches of government had been sub-
stantially diminished in size.
The court made significant findings regarding education policy that
would bind the legislature and executive, ranging from the determination
that there was a correlation between financial assistance and student suc-
cess to articulating specific education goals that should serve as the stan-
dard for measuring the adequacy of student education.2t 7 Throughout
the case, the plaintiffs sought to utilize new Regents Learning Standards
produced by the State Education Department as the standard of an ade-
quate education.218 Such a tactic placed the State in the peculiar position
of seemingly denigrating its own new standards as "aspirational," and
forced the state to argue for a lower standard of adequacy. 219 In fact, the
State continually argued for lower expectations of education outcomes,
directly at odds with its own Education Department's initiatives and pop-
ular sentiment.220
Despite the awkward State defenses and astute strategies of the
plaintiffs' utilization of the very education standards proposed by the
state, the verdict is mired in a morass of complex educational policy.
Although Judge DeGrasse excoriated the current financing system as
without formula and a "three men in a room" determination, it is unclear
whether the judicial oversight by one man over many qualitative compo-
nents of education is any better.221 Doubtless, concerns preponderate
that the court has overstepped the bounds of its institutional competency.
Whether this is in fact the case may well be a matter to be decided more
squarely on appeal.
216 187 Misc.2d at 116. The Septmeber 15, 2001 deadline was stayed given the present
appeal.
217 Id. at 114.
218 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., I In Evidence: Policy Reports from the CFE
Trial, Setting the Standard for a Sound Basic Education, Oct. 2000, at 4.
219 Id. at 11.
220 See Rothstein, supra note 154.
221 Id. at 83.
STANDARDS-BASED EDUCATION
Finally, the Title VI implementing regulations claim played a larger
role in this litigation than as simply an overture to public sentiment. Al-
though the remedies for such a violation are provided for in other regula-
tions, the utilization of this Federal law claim served the adequacy state
claim very well. To have found a violation of the regulations and yet
upheld the education finance system as constitutionally adequate would
have been a judicial affirmation of an unequal education system. This
finding would have placed state standards beneath that of Federal stan-
dards. Furthermore, the Federal holding may insulate both the judiciary
and the education system from attack. Neither constitutional amendment
nor other political machinations would alter the finding of discriminatory
effect. In addition, the Federal claim compelled the court to examine
more data on racial disparities, merging the claims and emphasizing the
inequitable results of the education finance system. The implementing
regulations claim ensures that race is not forgotten.
CONCLUSION
Almost fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education we remain far
from that cherished idea of equal education. The concurrent demise of
the civil rights movement and desegregation largely removed racial inte-
gration from the landscape of education reform. Technological advance-
ment and dismay over falling test scores have brought education
revitalized attention.
Focusing on the substantive content of education, one danger of the
adequacy claim is it gives rise to criticisms of nonjusticiability. Courts
become more entrenched in the creation of educational policy rather than
adjudicating its legality. Unfortunately, given the powerful impact of
prior Federal and State cases regarding equality claims, adequacy may
often be a litigant's and court's only recourse to correcting education
finance wrongs. However, litigants should take note of the dual claim
strategy employed in CFE v. New York and plead additional equality
causes of action whenever possible.
Concentrating on financial disparity, the greater danger of the ade-
quacy claim is its appeasement of local control justification and near en-
dorsement of a newly enlightened "separate but equal" doctrine. Too
many advocates of local autonomy adhere to the illusion that this cher-
ished internal distinction has no outward effect. Without focusing on
equality, education finance litigation permits us to ignore the fact that
local control can too easily justify a hierarchy of education funding, op-
portunity, and achievement. Without merging such concerns of equality
within an adequacy standard, we may only replicate this dangerous cycle
of disparity and segregation.
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